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International Refugee Law
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Abstract
The bad actorproblem, or the puzzle of how to get known human rights violators to
improve theirpractices,is central to human rights scholarship andpoliy-making. Scholarship
has largelyfocused on understandinghow and ifstate commitments to multilateralinternational
human rights treaties, such as the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, can
improve human rights pracices. This article reframes the bad actorproblem as a regulatoy
matter, suggesting that internationalagencies may, under certain conditions,provide a way to
get even' bad actors to improve their human rights practices. By flexibly interpreting
international law, international oganiZations can use their authoriy to coordinate state
interests, while enhancing the credibility of state commitments andproviding valuable legal cover
for state actions. I present examples of how international agencies may and have improved
human rights practices,focusing on the case of the use of internationalrefugee law during the
post-2003 Iraqi refugee crisis in Jordan and Syria. My analysis suggests that traditional
scholarly discussion ofpromoting compliance with internationalhuman rights instruments may
be mijplaced, and that the role of internationalagencies in regulating human rghts deserves
further attention.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The "bad actor problem," or the puzzle of how to get known human rights
violators to improve their practices, is central to human rights scholarship and
policy-making.' A great deal of international legal scholarship has focused on
understanding why states commit to international human rights law, and the
processes by which they may come to comply with it. 2 Much of this literature
implicitly assumes that promoting commitment to the rules expressed in
multilateral human rights treaties is a good way to get countries to improve their
human rights records. While essentially all empirical studies have concluded that
the human rights records of repressive regimes have not improved as a result of
their signing human rights treaties,3 human rights supporters continue to devote
significant effort to pushing these countries to commit to, and eventually comply
with, such multilateral instruments.
This article suggests that, under certain conditions, an international
organization can regulate, monitor, and implement human rights protections in a
way that may induce even bad actors to improve their human rights practices. By
serving as an intermediary to coordinate state interests and interpreting
international human rights law flexibly, international organizations have the
potential to improve human rights outcomes. My argument will focus on the
case of the U.N. Refugee Agency's implementation of international refugee law
during the post-2003 Iraqi refugee crisis. In this context, I explain how
insistence on compliance with the strictures of international human rights law
may sometimes have the effect of harming human rights, while flexible
interpretation can improve them. I will also discuss how my analysis may apply
to other international organizations that have assumed responsibility for
protecting human rights, particularly in states known as "bad actors."
This article contributes to our understanding of the growing role of
international administrative agencies, which has been under-studied in

I
2

3

Terminology adopted from Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
InternationalHuman Rights Iaw, 54 DUKE3 L.J. 621 (2004).
See, for example, id.; Harold Hongju Koh, How Is InternationalHuman Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
L.J. 1397 (1998); BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Emilie Hafner-Burton
& Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of InternationalHuman Rights Law to Matter Where Needed
Most, 44J. PEACE RFS. 407 (2007).
See, for example, SIMMONS, supra note 2; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 2; Eric Neumayer, Do
InternationalHuman Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RFSOL. 925
(2005); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1870 (2002);
Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights: Does it Make
a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PLACE RES. 95 (1999).
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international legal scholarship.4 As Andrew Guzman notes, legal scholars have
generally ignored the role of the soft law of international organizations.5 Some
scholarship has discussed organizations that monitor the major instruments of
international human rights law, such as the Committee Against Torture and the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and has repeatedly dismissed them as
ineffective.6 Literature on treaty flexibility mechanisms largely does not focus on
the workings of multi-lateral international agencies that have far more extensive
missions and functions.' The U.N. Refugee Agency (also known as the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR) and other
international agencies perform as regulators of human rights, not just as mere
monitors. They do so by promulgating interpretive regulations, monitoring
international human rights law on the ground through a network of hundreds of
country field offices, and providing valuable humanitarian services. Similar to
administrative agencies in the U.S., these agencies serve a rulemaking function
that affects the rights of millions as they interpret the provisions of international
human rights treaties.'
Finally, this article increases our understanding of international refugee law,
an area of international law of increasing importance. International refugee law is
a body of human rights law that has been largely under-studied, even as its
application extended to 10.5 million people at the end of 2012, before the Syrian
refugee crisis created hundreds of thousands more.9

4

For a call for more scholarship in this area, see Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard A.
Stewart, The Emergence of GlobalAdministrativeLaw, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).

5

See generally ANDREW T.

6

Pub. L. Research Paper No. 2015010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=2015010.
See, for example, JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005);

7

8
9

GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY (2008); Andrew T. Guzman, Doctor Frankenstein'sInternationalOrganiZations (U.C. Berkeley

Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intern.ystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of Modern
Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007).
For a review of this literature, see Laurence Heifer, Flexibiliy in International Agreements, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAl. REILATIONS: TAKING STOCK Ueffrey Dunoff & Mark
A. Pollack, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2012). See also Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, International Iaw, International Organizations, and Compiance, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Thomas Risse & Beth Simmons eds., 2002).
G.A. Res. 428 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/428(V) (December 14, 1950).
Scholarship on international refugee law tends to consider international refugee law separately
from other instruments of international human rights law, although the universal human rights
protections in these documents overlap significantly. Three of the most important and
comprehensive works on international refugee law include JAMES HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); GUY GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); ANDREAS ZIMMERMAN, THE 1951 CONVENTION
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFRUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL (2011).
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My case study of UNHCR's implementation of international refugee law in
the post-2003 Iraqi refugee crisis is based on six months of fieldwork and data
collection in Jordan, Syria, and Egypt; and three months at UNHCR
headquarters in Geneva, between 2007 and 2010. While in the field, I conducted
more than 100 interviews with employees of the Agency; other U.N. agencies;
NGOs assisting Iraqi refugees; and government officials from host countries,
donor countries, and Iraq. Data from these interviews enabled me to understand
the strategic calculations made by the Agency and state actors that influenced the
rights and fates of Iraqis. UNHCR officials in the field and at Headquarters also
provided me with internal documents and data that provided further insight into
the behavior of these actors. Thus, this Article contributes original empirical
research to support our understanding of international human rights.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to clarify what this Article does
not attempt to do. A comprehensive solution to getting bad actors to improve
human rights practices lies far beyond the scope of this project. I do not claim
that international organizations can always solve the bad actor problem, nor that
international agencies' actions to improve human rights in a particular instance
will necessarily improve overall human rights practices in a state. This Article
presents one example of how an international agency induced known bad actors
to improve their human rights practices by using its regulatory powers to
coordinate the interests of states. From this example, we can draw lessons that
may be generalizable to other contexts in which international agencies may
advance human rights.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Section 1, I will situate my argument
in the existing literature on compliance with international human rights law and
flexibility in international law. In Section II, I will provide background on the
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees ("the Convention") and UNHCR's
mandate to enforce it. I will explain how the malleability of the term "refugee"
and the expansion of the Agency's mission have allowed UNHCR to jettison the
letter of international refugee law in favor of a more flexible approach to refugee
"protection." In Section III, I will discuss the case study of UNHCR's treatment
of the post-2003 Iraqi refugees. I will explain how early attempts to get Jordan
and Syria, the countries which hosted the majority of Iraqi refugees, to comply
with international human rights law proved ineffective. These countries offered
limited rights to refugees only when UNHCR relaxed the legal definition of the
term "refugee" and coordinated the activities of wealthy donor countries and
refugee host states, including provision of foreign aid. In Section IV, I will
discuss the implications of allowing international agencies to regulate human
rights.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Much theoretical scholarship on international human rights argues that
multilateral treaties can improve human rights practices. According to these
theories, inclusive rights treaties, and the dialogical or social processes that
surround their negotiation and implementation, will eventually have the effect of
getting states to internalize, or at least mimic, human rights norms." These
theories suggest that, over the long term, these processes will influence even bad
actors to change their behavior. Bad actors who sign human rights treaties may
also be influenced by the impact that noncompliance may have on their
reputations." Non-signatories may also suffer reputation costs from not
complying with international norms.
However, if multilateral human rights treaties can solve the bad actor
problem, clear effects remain to be seen. Empirical scholars have repeatedly
found that commitment to international human rights treaties has not yet solved
the bad actor problem. Hathaway 2 and Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 3 empirically
test the idea that these treaties improve rights practices over time. Hathaway has
found that commitment to human rights treaties has no effect on human rights
practices, and in some cases may even have a negative effect. 4 Hafner-Burton
and Tsutsui have found that commitment to human rights treaties has no effect
in the most repressive regimes.' 5 Neumayer and Keith have found that global
and regional human rights treaties had no effect on human rights practices in the
year of ratification. 6 Simmons has found that signing of human rights treaties
may improve compliance by serving as a focal point to influence domestic actors
to lobby for improved rights conditions, but that this effect occurs only in
countries transitioning toward democracy, not in the most repressive regimes. 7
Rational choice theorists, such as Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, have
also been skeptical of the value of persuasion and acculturation in changing the
behavior of states.18 Goldsmith and Posner argue that states will only follow
10

See, for exatple, Harold Hongju Koh, WIy Do Nafions Obey?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997); ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995); Goodman & Jinks,
supra note 1.

11
12

GuzMAN, supra note 5.
See generaly HATHAWAY, supra note 9.

13

Seegeneraly Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supranote 2.

14

HATHAWAY, supra note 9.

15

Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 2.

16

Seegeneraly Neumayer, supra note 3; Keith, supra note 3.

17

See generalySIMMONS, supra note 2.

18

GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6.
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human rights norms when it is in their self-interest to do so, regardless of the
letter of international law. The interests of states may change through coercive
measures, or when wealthy states give poorer states economic incentives to
bring their incentives into line, regardless of states' internalization of any rights
norms.19 Goldsmith and Posner call the latter "asymmetric cooperation," but
explain that cooperation and coercion may be two sides of the same coin,
depending on the methods that strong or wealthy states use to change the
incentives of others.2 °
Indeed, coercive measures to stop human rights violations, such as military
intervention and sanctions, may be effective in changing state incentives to
improve their human rights practices. However, these coercive measures have
had mixed results and significant externalities. Military action against states, such
as NATO's recent intervention in Libya to protect the human rights of the
Libyan people, bear the risk of destroying valuable infrastructure or killing
innocent civilians. The efficacy of economic sanctions has also been widely
debated. 21 Moreover, sanctions may cause negative externalities, including the
perverse effect22 of hurting the human rights of innocents, or stymieing economic
development.
Coordinating states to align their economic incentives through an
international organization, however, may be a more efficient way to induce states
to follow human rights norms. Unlike legal processes or acculturation
mechanisms, agency actions may be effective in the short term. International
agencies can provide such a coordination function, along with the personnel and
monitoring expertise to ensure that coordination will be fruitful. Agencies may
also provide valuable cover for states who do not wish to act unilaterally-or
appear to act unilaterally-to get other states to do their bidding. As some
scholars have noted, acting through multilateral international organizations,
rather than unilaterally, can enhance the credibility of a state's commitment.23
Smaller or weaker states may also benefit from enhanced credibility by acting
through international organizations, or choose to work multilaterally through an

19

Id. at 107-34.

20

Id.

21

See, for example, Ella Shagabutdinova & Jeffrey Berejikian, Deploying Sanctions While Protecting Human
Rights: Are Humanitarian "Smart Sanctions" Effective?, 6 J. HUM. RTS. (2007).
For further discussion of the effectiveness and externalities of sanctions, see Daniel Drezner,
T1geted Sanctions in Theory and Practice, 13 INT'l. STUD. REV. 96 (2011).
Sanctions Sometimes Smm Tart.
On credible commitment, see, for example, Beth A. Simmons, InternationalLaw and State Behavior:

22
23

Commitment and Compliance in InternationalMonetay Affairs, 94 AM. P0l.. SC1. Ru v. 819 (2000).
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international agency to enhance their reputations within the international
community."
One useful framework for understanding the need for flexibility in
regulating human rights norms is provided by Laurence Helfer." Heifer analyzes
how the "overlegalization" of international human rights norms, or the
increasing codification of norms into formalized laws and enforcement
mechanisms in ways that constrain state sovereignty, has led to backlash by
governments, including withdrawal from human rights treaties and enforcement
mechanisms and denunciation of human rights norms.26 Helfer measures the
extent to which legalization of a norm has occurred using three variables
developed in previous literature: obligation, or the strength and scope of a
human rights commitment; precision, which captures the specificity of rules; and
delegation, the existence of a neutral body to interpret and implement these
rules.2 For Helfer, when international human rights law is "overlegalized" on
one or more of these three variables, whether because treaty bargains change or
enforcement improves, it will create a domestic backlash that may cause states,
even liberal democracies, to withdraw entirely from a human rights regime to
protect their self-interests. Helfer draws upon the example of Jamaica, Guyana,
and Trinidad and Tobago's withdrawal from a human rights treaty in the 1990s.
The relevant treaty provided that human rights claims be brought before the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. When this tribunal outlawed the death
penalty, the sovereignty costs of compliance on these states changed. The
countries withdrew from and denounced several relevant human rights treaties.
They also created a new Caribbean Court of Justice, which other countries
quickly joined. Helfer's argument suggests that using more flexibility in
enforcement of international law rather than tightening treaty bargains by adding
additional protocols or rigidly enforcing the letter of international law in a way
that increases sovereignty costs may be more effective in promoting
24

The importance of reputation effects in getting nations to respect international law has been
widely debated. See, for example, Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation, 50 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 232 (2009); Andrew T. Guzman, A Comptance-Based Theoy of InternationalLaw, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1823 (2002). Regardless of how reputation plays into overall compliance with international
law, some states may believe that their reputations will be enhanced through cooperation with
international organizations.

25

Laurence Helfer, Overlegali jng Human Rights. International Relations Theoy and the Commonwealth

26

Caibbean Backlash Against Human Righbts Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002) (discussing how
several Commonwealth Caribbean liberal democracies withdrew from human rights treaties in the
1990s after a Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decision banned the death penalty, thereby
raising sovereignty costs of compliance on these states).
Id at 1834.

27

For further discussion of these variables, see Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of LegaliZation,
54 INT'L ORG. 401 (2000).
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international human rights practices overall. If the countries in Helfer's example
had not had their sovereignty costs suddenly and radically altered by the Privy
Council's demand that they swiftly abolish the death penalty, they might still be
signatories to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and other human rights treaties, and individual claimants might still be able to
bring their cases before a court that was known to be sympathetic to many
claims.
This Article will build on Heifer's analysis and Goldsmith and Posner's
framework by proposing that international agencies can coordinate state
incentives while avoiding the potential backlash that comes from demanding
international obligations that threaten core state interests. International agencies
can align the economic incentives of states, providing both cover and credibility
for both aid donors and recipients. International agencies can also use flexibility
28
in interpreting international law to avoid a backlash from "overlegalization."
Using an international administrative agency to set context-specific standards for
interpretation of international human rights treaties, and to regulate the use of
economic incentives, may thus be an effective way to get bad actors to improve
their human rights practices. As studies have repeatedly shown that bad actors
cannot be induced to internalize or acculturate with international human rights
norms in the short-term,29 changing the cost-benefit analyses of states to make it
in their long-term interests to improve their human rights practices would seem
to be more effective than promoting compliance with international human rights
treaties.
III. THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
Scholarly analyses of major international human rights treaties largely
ignore international refugee law. Except for a brief mention by Koh,3 none of
the empirical or theoretical studies mentioned above discuss compliance with
international refugee law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention against Torture and
Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (CAT), and
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) have been studied extensively by
28

Id.

29

See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying discussion.

30

Koh describes how domestic political actors in the U.S. forced a change in policy on deporting
persecuted Haitian boat people. Most countries where refugees flee, however, are repressive
regimes in which such political advocacy for refugee rights may be impossible. See Koh, supra note
2.
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legal scholars and social scientists, but little attention has been paid to the
treatment of the 10.5 million of the world's citizens that qualify as refugees, or
the millions of other asylum-seekers who have applied for internationally
recognized legal status. 1 Given the importance of refugees to international
relations, and the growing numbers of refugees emanating from conflict since
the Arab Spring, this Article fills an important gap in the literature by
contributing to our understanding of international refugee law. It also
contributes to our understanding of how human rights norms can be enforced,
even in states that are notorious bad actors, and even in states that have not
signed the 1951 Convention.
A. The Malleable Definition of "Refugee" in
International Law
International refugee law is designed to provide a specific basket of rights
to a narrowly defined group of people. A refugee, according to the 1951
Convention, is someone who:
owing to wellfounded [sic] fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
such events, is unable or, owing to such
habitual residence as a result of
32
fear, is unwilling to return to it.
By signing the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, over two-thirds of states have adopted this definition of "refugee," in
recognition of international refugee law's overall aims of protecting those fleeing

31

32

For discussion of these studies, see notes 13-18 and accompanying discussion, above. Statistics

on refugees are from UNHCR. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2012 Global
Trends Report: Diplacement: The New 211" Centuy Challenge (2013) available at http://unhcr.org/
globaltrendsjune20l3/UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012 _V08 web.pdf.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. General Assembly, Resolution
2198 (XXI) (July 28, 1951) [hereinafter, "1951 Convention']. The 1951 Convention was originally
intended to benefit refugees in Europe after World War II, and this geographic restriction was
included in the treaty. The 1967 Protocol removed this geographic restriction. 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, (Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter, 1967 Protocol]. Through the
temporal restriction, the Convention excluded from its ambit the protection of Palestinian
refugees displaced by the creation of Israel in 1948. These refugees thus do not fall under the
protection of UNHCR. Instead, these refugees are served by the United Nations Refugee Works
Administration (UNRWA). The Agencies coordinate to protect Palestinians displaced at other
times, but UNRWA provides protection for most Palestinian refugees.
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persecution. To be recognized as a refugee by UNHCR,33 those seeking asylum
must ordinarily undergo Refugee Status Determination (RSD) proceedings
conducted by the countries in which they seek temporary or permanent asylum,
or by the Agency if host countries have given it authority to do so. Recognition
as a refugee by UNHCR allows those "refugees" to receive international
protection while they remain in their countries of first asylum, and to be eligible
for resettlement in a third country.
The 1951 Convention guarantees certain human rights for refugees. These
include the right to elementary education equal to that of nationals, the right to
work equal to other foreign nationals, the right to housing equal to those of
nationals, the right to public relief and assistance equivalent to nationals, and the
right to freedom of religion equivalent to nationals.34 At the core of the
Convention is the principle of non-refoulement:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of his territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,

membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. 35
Non-refoulement is considered to be a jus cogens norm, an internationally
recognized norm from which derogation is not permitted.36 Accordingly, Article
33 of the 1951 Convention, which covers non-refoulement, is a non-derogable
provision of the treaty.
Despite this precise legal definition and the wide international acceptance
of the Convention, various actors have extended the term "refugee" far beyond
the Convention definition, leading to varying descriptions of who a refugee is.
The Organization for African Unity (OAU), for example, takes the Convention
definition as a basis and adds that its definition of refugee also includes:
[E]very person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place

33

34

35
36

Pursuant to international refugee law, one becomes a "refugee" due to the circumstances of
persecution outlined in the Convention, not because one is registered with, or recognized as such,
by UNHCR.
See 1951 Convention, supra note 32.
See id.
The majority view among highly qualified publicists and commentators is that non-refoulement
has attained the status ofjus cogens despite some state practice to the contrary. For discussion of
the status of non-refoulement as ajus cogens norm, see Jean Allian, The Jus Cogens Nature of NonRefoulement, 13 INT'I.J. REFUGEF L. 4, 533, 558 (2001). See also Walter Kiin et al., Aricle 33, Para.
1, in THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING To THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL:
A COMMENTARY 1327, 1347-49 (Andreas Zimmermann ed., 2011).
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seek refuge in another place outside his
of habitual residence in order 3to
7
country of origin or nationality.
Drawing on the OAU's definition, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
similarly notes the need to enlarge the concept of a refugee beyond the 1951
Convention.3"
Partially because of such differing definitions, estimates vary widely as to
how many refugees exist. National Geographic, for example, reported that as
many as 35 million refugees existed in the world as of 2003, despite noting that
UNHCR recognized only 12 million at the time.39 Furthermore, the term
"refugee," which was intended to have a specific legal meaning, has been
expanded and contracted at various times by political actors to serve their
interests.4" For example, states may have an interest in downplaying the extent of
a conflict in which they are involved, and therefore may wish to deemphasize the
number of "refugees" caused by that conflict. States may also have interests in
calling attention to a conflict to attract international attention, and thus may wish
to inflate the numbers of "refugees" involved.
UNHCR also has had incentives to expand and contract the definition of
"refugee" to attract funding for its operations, or to save face in situations where
political constraints prevent it from adequately assisting large numbers of
refugees. Since the Agency is responsible for defining who is internationally
recognized as a "refugee," the Agency has tremendous control over the rights
and future prospects of those who meet its definition.
B. The Administrative and Regulatory Roles of the U.N.
Refugee Agency
The U.N. Refugee Agency serves as international refugee law's regulator on
the ground. The international community delegated authority to UNHCR for
37

38

Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001
U.N.T.S. 45.
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in
Central America, Mexico, and Panama, Nov. 22, 1984.

39

Hillary Mayell, World Refugees Number 35 Million, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIc NiWs Oune 16, 2003),
The
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/06/0616-030616_refugeel .html.
definition of "refugee" is further complicated because some sources conflate internally displaced
persons and refugees because conditions of displacement faced by the two groups are often
similar. UNHCR now counts both refugees and some IDPs within its populations of concern,
although it officially distinguishes between the two. Unlike refugees, IDPs still benefit from the
protections of citizenship within their home country, live without constant fear of deportation,
and at least in theory, receive protections from their governments.

40

Many examples can be found in Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, Chapter 4: Defining
Refugees and Voluntary Repatriation at the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees, in RuLES FOR
THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (2004).
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the purpose of solving the global regulatory problem of refugee protection. The
Agency is specifically tasked with supervising and promoting all international
instruments created for the purpose of protecting refugees.4' States rely on
UNHCR's expertise in refugee law and refugee protection, not only to ensure
that refugees receive legal protections, but also to insulate themselves from
problems caused by refugees. For example, in the 1990s, the U.S. and Europe
called upon UNHCR to provide assistance to displaced persons in the Balkans,
regardless of their refugee status, to contain the damage caused by the breakup
of the former Yugoslavia.42 Many states delegate authority for screening and
processing of refugees to the Agency, thus ensuring that applicants do not
overwhelm their own asylum systems.
The behavior of the Agency is constrained by the states that it serves. The
Agency gets 93 percent of its budget from individual donor states. The U.S. has
consistently been UNHCR's single largest donor, typically funding about 30
percent of the Agency's budget. 3 The European Commission is typically the
Agency's second or third largest donor in any given year, with its member states
comprising most of the Agency's top ten donors.' Both the U.S. and the EU
exclusively earmark their contributions to UNHCR, as do most countries, to
ensure that the Agency serves their foreign policy goals.4" Because the Agency
receives so much of its funding from these donor states, these states exert
significant control over the Agency. To the extent that donor states are
committed to promoting human rights, the Agency can serve as a foreign policy
tool to influence improvement of human rights practices.4 6
The countries in which UNHCR operates also constrain its operations.
UNHCR's field offices operate at the pleasure of host country governments,
who can shut down those offices and expel UNHCR officials in protest of
Agency policies. Countries have, in fact, done so when the Agency has gone too
far in shaming them for their human rights practices or their noncompliance
with international refugee law.47
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Despite these constraints, as with most administrative agencies, UNHCR
has more authority than is suggested by the statute that created it or the size of
its budget.4" The Agency derives independent authority from its expertise in
managing and processing refugees. The Agency also derives considerable moral
authority because of its mission to protect refugees. Exercising its ethical clout,
UNHCR can use this authority to appeal to states, or even shame them, into
providing funding for efforts it identifies as important.49
UNHCR also has independent authority because of its ability to
promulgate regulations that then shape the behavior of other political actors.
Most importantly, UNHCR can define who is and is not a "refugee" for the
purposes of its operations. As discussed above, the Agency has the ultimate
power to determine whether someone has "refugee" status. UNHCR decides
which individuals or groups are worthy of international legal protections and
access to its resettlement programs, determining the rights and opportunities of
millions. UNHCR can also terminate the refugee status of individuals or groups,
sometimes without the consent of the refugees themselves. At times, the Agency
has ceased the status of groups of refugees and assisted in their repatriation,
sometimes without their full consent."0 Such a practice directly violates the
Agency's mission under the 1951 Convention, which requires that refugees
themselves must make the decision to return to their countries of origin."1 The
Agency may also expand the definition of refugee to encompass entire groups of
people. For example, in cases where a mass influx of refugees quickly enters a
country, UNHCR sometimes declares a "prima facie" regime, which assumes
that all members of a particular group are refugees given conditions of violence
in their country of origin. 2 The Agency can thus expand and contract the
definition of refugee, regardless of the individual's reasons for flight, and
regardless of the specific requirement of persecution enshrined in the
Convention.

48

On the sources of UNHCR's power, see MICHAEL N. BARNETT & MARTHA

FINNEMORE,

RULES

FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAl. POLmICS (2004).
49
50

For further discussion of UNHCR's authority, see id. at 73-120.
For example, the Agency repatriated 10,000 Salvadorans from Honduras between 1985 and 1987,
without ascertaining whether their return was fully voluntary. LOESCHER, supra note 42, at 253--54.
For discussion of cessation of refugee status, see UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection,
Cessation of Refugee Status Under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (The "Ceased Circumstances" Clauses), 10 February 2003.

51

Seegeneraly DELEGATION

52

et al. eds., 2006).
See generally Bonaventure Rutinwa, Prima Facie Status and Refugee Protection (United Nations High

AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL, ORGANIZATIONS

(Darren G. Hawkins

Commissioner for Refugees, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Working Paper No. 69, 2002).

Vol. 14 No. 2

Regulating Human Rights

IV.

Go/densel

CASE STUDY: THE POST-2003 IRAQI REFUGEE CRISIS

UNHCR's actions and inactions during the post-2003 Iraqi refugee crisis
present an example of how an international agency can safeguard human rights
by flexibly implementing international law. Early in the Iraq War, UNHCR
attempted to force Jordan and Syria to comply with international refugee law,
and its efforts were met with backlash. Later in the war, the Agency shifted its
tactics from promoting international law to providing humanitarian assistance to
refugees. Moving away from "overlegalization" allowed the Agency to
coordinate the incentives of donor and recipient countries. By providing political
cover for donor states, the Agency enabled them to quietly contain the damage
from the war that they had caused. By flexibly interpreting the legal term
"refugee," the Agency enabled host states to inflate the numbers of Iraqis within
their borders, which allowed them to attract sufficient funding to offset the costs
of hosting refugees.
A. The Beginning of the Iraqi Refugee Crisis
February 22, 2006 is widely considered to be the start of full-scale sectarian
conflict in Iraq. On that date, Sunni extremists bombed the Al-Askari Mosque, a
Shi'a shrine in Samarra, Iraq. Shi'a militias quickly retaliated, and fighting
escalated. Shortly thereafter, a Brookings Institution report concluded that civil
conflict in Iraq had reached "a point of no return." 3 Analysts began to debate
whether Iraq had slid into "civil war," which became a hotly contested political
4
5

term.

According to U.S. government sources and U.N. Refugee Agency officials,
the Samarra Shrine bombing was also the birth of the Iraqi refugee crisis. The
Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, Ellen

Sauerbrey, testified before Congress that mass outflows of Iraqi refugees began
only after Samarra. 5 According to Radhouane Nouicer, the head of UNHCR's
Middle East and North Africa Division, after Samarra, as many as 2,500 Iraqis
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per day began to arrive at the Syrian border.56 In December 2006, The New
York Times reported a total exodus of 3,000 per day.57
However, outflows of Iraqis into neighboring countries began long before
the Samarra shrine bombing. Contrary to conventional wisdom that early flight
was limited to wealthy Iraqis, 8 significant evidence suggests that Iraqis of all
classes fled early in the war because their lives were at stake. The persecution of
minority groups who were thought to have supported the Ba'athist regime began
almost immediately after the invasion. Sunni and Shi'a holy sites alike were
attacked early in the war.59 The U.S. sieges on Fallujah in November 2004
destroyed many living areas for Sunnis. Radical Shi'a began to target Christians
and other religious minorities as early as 2004. Targeting of churches, shrines,
and holy sites by insurgents led to flight by Sunni, Shi'a, and religious minorities
alike. UNHCR's field offices in Jordan and Syria began to report that Iraqis were
approaching their offices for assistance in increased numbers. According to
UNHCR's registration statistics and several studies conducted by reputable
social scientists in Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, more than 20 percent of Iraqis
entered these and other neighboring countries prior to 2006.60
Before 2006, however, the international community and refugee host
countries largely did nothing to protect the human rights of refugees. Refugees
were treated as tourists and could therefore be deported for overstaying their
visas. The governments of countries hosting Iraqis did not set up refugee camps,
which generally provide UNHCR with the most convenient way to find refugees
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and provide them with services. Countries wished to avoid a "Palestinianization"
of the Iraqi situation.6 1 By this, countries meant that they did not want to create
camps that would induce Iraqis to remain in the country for the long term. As
one senior UNHCR official explained, "[c]amps are easy to open and difficult to
close. '"" Also, since the vast majority of Iraqi refugees came from Baghdad, they
had a propensity to settle in cities, and most Iraqis moved to their host
countries' capital cities or other urban centers.63 The absence of border camps
meant that the inflows did not attract media attention, since no spectacle of
refugees huddled in crowded conditions existed.
Although millions of refugees elsewhere lived in urban settings, providing
refugee protection in the urban context-especially in Middle Eastern states that
were not signatories to the 1951 Convention-posed a relatively new challenge
for UNHCR.64 The Agency first introduced a policy on urban refugees in 1997,
which met with harsh criticism from NGOs and human rights organizations,
who claimed that the policy discriminated against refugees who did not live in
camps, did not recognize their right to international protection, and
characterized them as "troublemakers." 6 As Iraqi refugee flows grew into one of
the largest urban refugee crises the Agency had ever faced, the urban refugee
policy had not yet been revised. 66 The Agency also had a relatively low profile in
the Middle East.6 7 While it operated field offices in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and
Egypt long before the Iraq war, the Agency had low standing in the region as a
result of negative public opinion of the U.N. because of its involvement in the
1991 Iraq war, and because of the Agency's mishandling of Iraqi Kurdish
refugees and internally displaced people during the subsequent crisis of 19911992.68 Thus, when Iraqis fled into urban settings after the U.S. invasion of 2003,
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the Agency had no international commitments from the host countries involved,
no sound policy on which to rely, and no strong track record of operations in
the region. Agency officials were forced to innovate on the fly in response to the
rapidly changing situation on the ground.
B. Flexible Interpretation of International Law Succeeds in
Improving Rights Outcomes
Faced with the new challenge of operating in the urban context in the
Middle East, the Agency had to be flexible in its implementation of international
refugee law. Under its mission, the Agency's first tools to protect refugees are
usually the 1951 Convention and the domestic laws of the asylum countries. In
the countries hosting Iraqis, UNHCR did not have much law to work with. Of
the six countries hosting Iraqis-Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, and
Iran--only Egypt and Turkey are signatories to the 1951 Convention. Jordan
and Syria have rhetorically expressed that they "believe" in the 1951 Convention,
but will not sign it for fear that it may be applied to the Palestinian refugees
within their borders.69 Domestic asylum regimes in all of these countries are
weak or absent. Even before the war, UNHCR regularly pressured nonsignatories to accede to the 1951 Convention, believing this to be an important
step toward refugee protection.7"
When it cannot convince states to accede to the 1951 Convention,
UNHCR relies on Convention norms as a framework for promoting the human
rights of refugees. UNHCR also turns to other instruments of international law
that overlap with the 1951 Convention, such as the right to education in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.71 If countries do not live up to their
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commitments under international law, UNHCR can publicly shame these
countries for not doing so, hoping that reputation costs will pressure them into
compliance. v2 UNHCR also attempts to get countries to sign soft legal
agreements, such as Memoranda of Understanding, that allow host countries to
adopt part of the Convention framework. 3 UNHCR may also promulgate its
own regulations to promote refugee protection, with or without the consent of
host countries.
At the beginning of the war, UNHCR attempted to use all of these tools to
protect Iraqi refugees. UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
the Jordanian Government in 1998, which provides that refugees will have the
right of non-refoulement, the right to work, the right to freedom of religion,
exemption from fines for overstaying their visas, and will receive treatment
according to "internationally accepted standards." 4 In 2003, UNHCR and the
Government of Jordan signed an additional Letter of Understanding, affirming
the commitment of both parties to the 1998 Memorandum and providing for
UNHCR's access to any refugees entering Jordan from Iraq.7" All of the
countries hosting Iraqis have delegated to UNHCR the job of Refugee Status
Determination rather than screening and processing refugees themselves.7 6
On the eve of the war, UNHCR declared a "Temporary Protection
Regime" (TPR) for "all Iraqi nationals or those persons with habitual residence
in Iraq" who would flee to neighboring countries after the start of the war. The
term "temporary protection" is ordinarily a tool used by countries to grant
limited, temporary asylum to nationals of a country that has experienced conflict
or disaster.7 For example, in 2012, the U.S. declared that Syrian nationals would
benefit from temporary protection so that they would not have to return to
rapidly deteriorating conditions.7 8 Under international law, a sovereign nation is
the only actor able to declare protection for nationals of another country within
its borders. However, UNHCR had previously invoked TPRs with some
72
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success, in settings such as the Southeast Asian exodus of the 1 9 70s and 1980s
and the Kosovo refugee crisis. 7 The Agency uses TPRs to grant some degree of
legal protection to mixed flows of forced migrants and refugees pending
Refugee Status Determination. When UNHCR is unable to immediately process
mass flows of refugees, a TPR gives them time to sort people out.8"
UNHCR's attempts to promote international law, hard or soft, may have
harmed its ability to protect refugees early in the war. UNHCR's declaration of
the TPR was done without consultation of the host countries, and had no
binding legal effect. Of the six major countries of first asylum for Iraqis, all
except Syria officially rejected the TPR, and Syria largely ignored it in practice.81
After Saddam Hussein's government officially fell, Jordanian authorities decided
that Iraqis should return home, and began to deport even those Iraqis who had
UNHCR asylum cards.8" When the U.S. Government began to accuse Syria of
harboring former members of Saddam's regime, Syria also refouled some Iraqis,
angering UNHCR.83 Egypt, too, refouled Iraqis early in the war, violating its
commitments under the 1951 Convention.84 Tensions between the Agency and
host countries rose after it declared the TPR, making it difficult for UNHCR to
provide protections for refugees.
C. Silence on the Iraqi Plight: 2003-2006
Thus, UNHCR's efforts to promote legal protections for Iraqis early in the
war raised the ire of host countries. Tension between UNHCR and these
governments limited the Agency's ability to protect Iraqis within their borders.
When UNHCR-Jordan attempted to advocate for Iraqis to receive legal
protections in Jordan, the government shut down its offices.85 Security forces in
Jordan and Syria did not notify the Agency when Iraqi asylum-seekers were
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detained, in violation of the government's Memorandum of Understanding with
UNHCR.8 6
Host states decided to stay quiet about the needs of Iraqis who fled early in
the war, in accordance with their own economic, security, and foreign policy
reasons. Even as needy Iraqis began to enter their countries in larger numbers
and tens of thousands of refugees began to register with UNHCR's offices,8 7
countries hosting refugees largely remained silent about their humanitarian
needs. Before 2007, none of the six countries of first asylum requested
international assistance to help Iraqis. Host countries did not want to offend
those wealthy Iraqis who were providing investment in their countries or
benefitting their economies by spending remittances.88 These countries also
wanted to curry favor with the new Government of Iraq, who did not want to
admit that it was unstable and bleeding refugees.89 Countries also had security
concerns about conflict spillover, and did not want to call international attention
to the existence of Ba'ath party members and some insurgents within their
borders.9" Host countries also likely had the incentive not to contradict U.S.
86
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policy, which maintained that the war was going well. Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon,
and Turkey likely did not wish not to upset their strategic ally and trading
partner.9 Syria and Iran also had the incentive not to upset the U.S., with which
it hoped to re-establish diplomatic relations.92
Without legal recognition by their host countries or UNHCR, Iraqi
refugees lived in a precarious situation. Iraqis could be deported at any time for
overstaying their visas. Jordan only allowed those Iraqis with valid residency
permits to access its school and healthcare systems. Syria officially allowed Iraqis
access to these public services, but in reality, they were turned away in large
numbers.93 Refugees did not have the right to work in any of their host
countries, and sporadic crackdowns and deportations of those who took illegal
jobs deterred Iraqis from seeking livelihoods.94 The world did not seem to notice
the rapidly developing humanitarian needs of displaced Iraqis.
D. Policy Shifts in the U.S.
By mid-2006, domestic political forces in the U.S. began to question the
Bush administration's official stance that the war was going well. In March 2006,
Congress appointed an independent, bipartisan commission, led by James Baker
and Lee Hamilton, to lead an Iraq Study Group that would create a report on
the war effort. In August 2006, a memo from the Defense Intelligence Agency
analyst Derek Harvey reported that there would be an "inevitable fracturing of
Iraq" if the U.S. did not change its policies.95 On November 22, 2006, the U.N.
reported that the civilian death toll in Iraq had reached a new high.96
Opinion polls in an election year also suggested that public support for the
war was changing. According to nearly all reliable polling sources, the number of
Democrats and independent voters who approved of the war had plummeted by
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2006." 7 Throughout 2006, more than 70 percent of voters polled by Gallup
stated that the situation in Iraq would be an "extremely important" or "very
important" issue in determining their votes in the 2006 election.98 Picking up on
public opinion from their base and potential voters, Democrats began to push to
change the war effort. On July 30, 2006, Congressional Democrats sent
President Bush a letter advising him to change course in Iraq.99 Democrats
began to speak more vociferously against the war in their campaigns.
E. Change in UNHCR's Legal Strategy
U.S. policy changes likely began to drive a shift in Agency and host country
policy. As U.S. public opinion on the war shifted in mid-2006, UNHCR "began
receiving signals from Washington" that it was time to address the Iraqi
refugees, according to a Senior Adviser in UNHCR. ° In mid-2006, UNHCR
hired Andrew Harper, who eventually became the head of UNHCR's Iraq
Support Unit, on a three month contract to figure out for the Agency "what was
going on." ' Harper traveled to the region and found many Iraqis in dire straits.
Harper said that at that point, UNHCR recognized that it needed to lead the
effort to bring the international community's attention to the crisis, since many
political actors still wanted to downplay the humanitarian situation and believed
that the U.S. efforts were working.10 2 According to High Commissioner Antonio
Guterres, in the summer of 2006, UNHCR began planning to hold an
international conference to announce massive donor support for the crisis.1" 3
Guterres began to travel to drum up contributions for improvements in specific
human rights practices: improving Iraqis' access to healthcare and education in
their host countries, and protecting refugees from non-refoulement.
At this time, Guterres also made a conscious decision to downplay the legal
aspects of the crisis. As his special assistant put it, the High Commissioner
decided that rather than "banging on the Bible," it was better to get things
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done.1" 4 If pushing for international legal protections was not going to work to
assist refugees, UNHCR needed to find something that would. The Agency
decided to downplay the international legal aspects of its operation, and instead,
to focus on the humanitarian needs of Iraqis. UNHCR stopped advocating for
countries to grant Iraqis legal residence and the right to work, controversial
topics in countries with other large refugee populations and high unemployment.
Instead, UNHCR refrained its efforts in humanitarian terms, focusing on
helping Iraqis to obtain education and healthcare, and ensuring that they would
not be refouled °5
This change in strategy was crucial to achieving human rights protections
for Iraqis. Guterres explained that refraining the Agency's efforts in
humanitarian terms was essential for gaining the trust of host country
governments and ensuring the success of its operations. 10 6 As the Head of the
Iraq program explained, this strategy was especially important in Syria, where the
government was skeptical of international agencies and international law.10 7
Nawaf Tell, the Director of the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman, Jordan,
who also held the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' special portfolio for Iraqis in
Jordan, stated that Jordanian policy changed when UNHCR stopped asking
Jordan to grant Iraqis legal residence and changed its tactics to those of assisting
a community in need. 08 According to Tell, it would have been impossible for
the government to agree to give Iraqis access to education if UNHCR had
continued to advocate for Jordan to give Iraqis legal residence and the right to
work. 9 Thus, UNHCR's change in strategy, from promoting international law
to promoting humanitarianism, was essential to achieving better human rights
outcomes for Iraqis.
F. Change in U.S. Policy Enhances Agency Efforts
The Agency's diplomatic efforts were gaining success in the region, and it
was beginning to get funding for its efforts from non-U.S. states and private
donors. 10 The Agency's funding multiplied after the U.S.'s official policy
positions on the Iraqi refugee crisis, and the Iraq War generally, began to
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change. 1 ' In December of 2006, following a Democratic sweep in Congressional
elections, President Bush convened his advisers several times to discuss how
policy should change in Iraq. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group report, released in
December, warned that
a dramatically increasing refugee population could
12
region."
the
destabilize
Led by Senator Edward Kennedy, the Senate addressed Iraqi refugees for
the first time on January 16, 2007 in a hearing on "The Plight of the Iraqi
Refugees." Senators grilled Ellen Sauerbrey, the Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, who stated that massive
displacement only began after the "Sumara [sic] shrine bombing in April" of
2006, although the bombing actually occurred in February.' 13 She also claimed,
"So it was not until about, I would say, July or August that we started becoming
aware that there was a large number of people" fleeing outside of Iraq." 4
Kennedy then introduced into Congress a bill to assist Iraqi refugees, a version
of which passed the Senate in June 2007.115
While the Agency's ability to launch a major operation to protect Iraqis
may have been constrained by the lack of U.S. support, the Agency had been
working to coordinate state interests even before its largest donor began to
support its efforts. During the January hearings, Kennedy and Sauerbrey
mentioned that UNHCR had begun to coordinate international efforts to assist
refugees. They said that the Agency was "moving forward" on plans for a
regional conference to address the issue of Iraqi refugees, and that the Senate
would learn more about this from a UNHCR representative." 6 During his
statement, the UNHCR representative asked the U.S. to attend the conference,
which it soon agreed to do.
G. UNHCR's Regulations Enable Alignment of State Interests
Soon after the U.S. agreed to back the Agency's efforts, UNHCR relaxed
the definition of "refugee" in a way that would help align state interests.
Exercising its rulemaking powers, in January 2007, UNHCR declared that it was
granting "prima facie" refugee status to all Iraqis originating from south and
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central Iraq-excluding those from Iraqi Kurdistan." 7 All Iraqis originating from
these regions would be presumed to be "refugees" by the Agency, regardless of
whether host countries considered them to be so under their own domestic law.
This meant a de facto classification of nearly all of these Iraqis to be "refugees."
The Agency did not then conduct Refugee Status Determination (RSD)
proceedings to determine whether they met the Convention definition.11 The
prima facie regime was also retroactive. All Iraqis originating from these
governorates-regardless of when they entered the country or their reasons for
flight-were now treated as "refugees" by the Agency. The prima facie regime
thus encompassed, for example, Iraqi businessmen who regularly traveled back
and forth to Iraq before and during the war," 9 and those with residences in both
Iraq and the countries of first asylum. In declaring the prima facie regime,
UNHCR thus abandoned the 1951 Convention's definition of refugee, which is
specific to those who fled persecution.
Declaring a prima facie regime shaped the subsequent behavior of the
Agency and host countries. The prima facie regime allowed the Agency to solve
the practical problem of not having enough resources to conduct Refugee Status
Determinations for all Iraqis entering or already present in the host countries at
this time. 2 ' However, once the prima facie regime was announced, it became
impossible to specify how many met the Convention definition of "refugee."
The prima facie regime thus also allowed host countries to inflate the numbers
of Iraqis within their borders to attract more funding than they actually needed.
At the Donor's Conference in April 2007, Jordan claimed they were hosting
750,000 Iraqis, and Syria claimed they were hosting 1.2 million. UNHCR and the
host countries solicited funding based on these numbers. While precise estimates
of a moving population are impossible, later estimates suggest that only about
100,000-200,000 Iraqis were ever present in Jordan, and that Syria also hosted
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significantly fewer.' UNHCR itself later admitted to inflating the numbers to
attract funding for its operations.'2 2
Declaring a prima facie regime also provided cover for UNHCR and the
host and donor countries. At the Donor's Conference, host countries reported
estimates of displaced Iraqis to be much higher than those registered with the
Agency. It would have been embarrassing for UNHCR to admit that it had
missed assisting more than two million Iraqi refugees, and politically awkward
for both donor and host countries to admit that they had previously failed to
recognize so many Iraqis in need. The prima facie regime enabled all involved
parties to admit that millions of Iraqis did not show up overnight, but that
previously, there were few "refugees" in need of assistance. Previously, host
countries considered Iraqis to be tourists or "guests." The international
community only began to treat Iraqis as "refugees"-and many Iraqis began to
consider themselves refugees-after UNHCR deemed them to be so.
In instituting this prima facie regime for Iraqi refugees, UNHCR deviated
from the letter of international law, as well as the intentions of the law's framers.
According to the preferences of 147 of the U.N.'s 192 member states, as
expressed in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, refugees are victims of
persecution who merit certain legal protections that others do not. In declaring
the prima facie regime, UNHCR enabled wealthy and needy Iraqis alike to be
deemed "refugees." This allowed both refugees and migrants access to its thirdcountry refugee resettlement program, which became the largest in the Agency's
history. UNHCR thus allowed resettlement countries to cherry-pick
economically productive or wealthy Iraqis while it advocated for the most
vulnerable refugees to be resettled. By allowing resettlement to pull in both
refugees and economic migrants, UNHCR may have facilitated Iraq's brain
drain.
UNHCR also softened its terminology regarding legal protection of
refugees, the core of its mandate under international law. The Agency began to
phase out its use of the term "protection," replacing it with "protection space."
According to Andrew Harper, the semantics mattered a great deal to the
countries of first asylum.' 23 "Protection" connoted international legal obligations
to refugees and the Agency's attempts to enforce them; "protection space" did
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not. Harper saw "protection space" as the Agency's attempt to offer refugees
124
more than just legal protection.
However, according to others in the organization, this change in
terminology signaled that the Agency was actually offering less protection to
refugees. As one protection officer at UNHCR-Syria, Petros Mastakis, explained,
UNHCR was denying its responsibilities to refugees under international law by
refusing to use these terms. 12' For lawyers within the organization, "protection"
was a well-developed concept that had been given teeth by national courts
throughout the world. By refusing to enforce "protection," UNHCR effectively
signaled to countries of first asylum that it would not attempt to enforce the
letter of international law. Instead, UNHCR would attempt to preserve a vague
"protection space" in which most Iraqis could subsist, but with no guarantees of
human rights.
UNHCR thus softened its stance on seeking compliance with international
human rights law and relaxed its definition of "refugee" to help align the
interests of donor and host countries. Rather than attempting to impose
international law on host states, UNHCR chose to focus on humanitarian
assistance such as access to education, access to healthcare, and access to social
services that it and its NGO implementing partners would provide. UNHCR
launched a campaign to get funding to achieve these three goals.'2 6 By softening
its stance on seeking compliance with international human rights law, the U.N.
Refugee Agency signaled to countries that it would not attempt to shame them
or infringe on their sovereignty by forcing legal commitments these states did
not want. Instead, the Agency sought to coordinate the incentives of donor and
host states to get host states to improve human rights outcomes without
characterizing them as legal requirements.
H. The Effects of International Regulation
UNHCR successfully coordinated the international community's efforts to
assist Iraqis. Working through UNHCR, donors provided economic incentives
that led to a change in the host countries' cost-benefit analysis in hosting
refugees. As such, UNHCR's funding for its Iraq operation increased
dramatically. Between 2006 and 2007, Jordan's field office expenditure went
from 3.4 million in 2006 to over 40.5 million in 2007, and the Syria office's
124 Id.
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expenditure went from 2.8 million to 55.4 million. 127 While most money for
UNHCR's Iraq operation came from the U.S., non-U.S. contributions also
multiplied from seven million to 80.4 million during this period. 128 The Agency
also began to coordinate bilateral aid to host countries, which was not an
uncommon strategy for the Agency, but not a usual one. 129 Following the
Donor's Conference and UNHCR's relaxation of the definition of "refugee,"
both Jordan and Syria began to change their policies regarding Iraqis. Both
notoriously repressive authoritarian regimes responded to UNHCR's
coordination efforts, and began to allow Iraqis greater access to social services
provided by the government and also by NGOs.
Following the receipt of funding from UNHCR, Syria permitted the
Agency to expand its operations. 130 It also allowed UNHCR to begin food
distributions every other month for needy Iraqis. Syria also began to allow Iraqis
unrestricted access into their public healthcare systems, with UNHCR
subsidizing care for Iraqis. UNHCR and other international donors also enabled
13
the building of new health clinics that served Syrians and Iraqis alike. 1
Syria also slowly began to allow International NGOs (INGOs) into the
country, which introduced programs to assist both Iraqis and Syrians. Syria had
long been wary of the presence of any international organizations, believing that
they were spies for the United States or for "Zionist organizations.' ' 132 After the
Donor's Conference, Syria took steps to authorize INGOs to operate in the
133
country. In February 2008, the first INGO was authorized to operate in Syria,
and fifteen other NGOs had followed suit by the middle of 2010.134 The Syrian
Arab Red Crescent (SARC) supervised these INGOs. 35 While SARC is a
member of the International Federation of the Red Cross, there is also a
Ministry of SARC Affairs within the Syrian government, making it part of the
state apparatus. SARC, along with the Ministries of Health and Education,
127
128
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provided close-and sometimes intrusive-government monitoring of INGO
operations within the country.'3 6 The U.S. and other donor countries funneled
aid to Syria through UNHCR and its NGO implementing partners, using them
as cover to distribute money to a regime with which it refused to politically
engage in public. Since host countries required all INGOs to have 20 to 30
percent of their beneficiaries be members of the host country population, tens
of thousands of needy locals were assisted alongside the Iraqis.
UNHCR's offer of funding induced Jordan, too, to change its policies.
UNHCR began to donate funding directly to the Government of Jordan. In
June 2007, UNHCR gave 61 percent of its operational budget, or about $21
million, directly to the Jordanian government. 3 7 Country Representative Imran
Riza stated that this donation was given as a "signal to Jordan that the
international community would support the creation of 'protection space' for the
Iraqis."' 38 Only after that, in August 2007, did the Jordanian government
officially announce that it was opening up its healthcare and education systems
to Iraqis, assuring Iraqis that they would not be deported for using public
services."' At this time, UNHCR also gained increased access to those in need
of legal protections, for example, those who were detained by the authorities for
crimes.
Thus, Jordan and Syria began to give human rights to refugees, including
the right to education, the right to services such as healthcare, and protections
against refoulement, when UNHCR relaxed its commitment to international law,
and when wealthier states agreed to fund the Agency's efforts. Even as facts on
the ground changed and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis entered their countries,
Jordan and Syria did not offer them rights or humanitarian assistance until the
international community offered them economic incentives to do so. Although
these countries began to acknowledge that needy Iraqis were within their
borders and to assess their needs when the U.S. changed its position on the war,
changing U.S. policy alone was not enough for these countries to improve
human rights for Iraqis. Instead, as this case study demonstrates, UNHCR's
management of international assistance turned the presence of needy Iraqis from
a cost into a benefit. In addition to short-term humanitarian and long-term
development aid, significant evidence also exists that the Jordanian and Syrian
governments derived some direct benefits from the payment of foreign aid
designated for Iraqis."4
136
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The Agency's role in coordinating state actions was essential to protecting
the rights of Iraqis. Countries could not have bribed Jordan and Syria to grant
rights to Iraqis directly, resulting in what Goldsmith and Posner call
"nonlegalized asymmetric cooperation.' 1 41 Without the cover of UNHCR as an
administrative agency, coercing countries into providing international human
rights for Iraqis would have been far less likely. By coordinating efforts to assist
Iraqis, UNHCR provided cover for the U.S., the U.K. and members of the
Multi-National Force who invaded Iraq and likely wanted to minimize their
visibility in assisting Iraqi refugees fleeing the war they had wrought. The U.S.
and others especially wanted to hide their aid to Syria, which seemingly
contradicted their other foreign policy objectives.142 The Government of Iraq,
too, funneled its contributions through UNHCR,"' which enabled it not to
publicly admit that it was unstable.
Thus, UNHCR used its status as a regulator charged with implementation
and enforcement of international refugee law to shape the behavior of the states
in which it operated, granting money to countries who agreed to provide
refugees with the de facto rights to education, social services, and nonrefoulement guaranteed by the 1951 Convention, even if these countries did not
recognize them as rights per se. Without the Agency on the ground to monitor
administration of its funding, the international community could not have
ensured that its goals of providing certain rights would be achieved. If the
Agency had not relaxed the term "refugee," the host countries would not have
been able to attract the funding that changed their cost-benefit analysis. Thus,
the Agency's flexibility in interpreting international law, recasting of the Iraqi
refugee crisis in humanitarian rather than legal terms, combined with its
coordination of donor and host state interests, coerced notorious "bad actors"
to give Iraqis human rights.
V. APPLICATIONS
A. Positive Implications of Human Rights Regulation by
International Agencies
The example of the implementation of international refugee law during the
post-2003 Iraqi refugee crisis suggests that treating human rights
implementation as a regulatory problem might, under certain conditions, help
141
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induce bad actors to improve their human rights practices. International agencies
may be better positioned than treaty regimes to change human rights practices
because of their capacity for responsiveness and flexibility, their expertise, their
inclusiveness, and their ability to provide cover for state actions.
Unlike treaty regimes, international agencies have the potential to improve
international human rights practices in the short term. As discussed above, while
processes such as persuasion and acculturation may work to convince these
actors to change their behavior over time, empirical studies have shown that
these strategies do not influence known human rights violators to change their
practices in the short term. By contrast, international agencies may be able to get
even bad actors to improve their human rights practices through quick, flexible
responses to rapidly changing, volatile circumstances in which grave human
rights violations can occur. Treaty monitoring bodies are primarily positioned to
"name and shame" countries for human rights violations after they have
occurred. International agencies, by contrast, have offices in host countries and
working relationships with the governments and communities in which they
operate. With their boots positioned on the ground, these agencies can more
easily become apprised of potential human rights violations and prevent them or
to swiftly respond. Expert knowledge of local and regional contexts also enables
international agencies to calibrate the response of the international community
to most effectively protect human rights in particular circumstances. In Jordan
and Syria during the Iraqi refugee crisis, this meant that UNHCR shifted its
focus from providing legal protection for refugees to providing humanitarian aid
for needy populations, and softened its use of international legal terminology
accordingly. Whether emergency situations force non-compliance with the letter
of trade agreements, labor standards, environmental agreements, or other
international agreements, international organizations can promulgate flexible
rules to improve human rights outcomes rather than forcing countries to accept
major multilateral human rights instruments in their entirety. Employing their
discretion as regulators on the ground, these organizations may be best
positioned to determine how to flexibly interpret law to improve human rights
practices while avoiding the problem of backlash in their host states.
The expertise of international agencies also means that they provide
tangible benefits that signing a treaty alone cannot provide. Agencies perform
valuable services for host countries. All international agencies provide a valuable
liaison function between the host nation and the rest of the world. While the
functions of international agencies vary greatly, all offer programs and services
that help countries solve social welfare problems, such as education, food
provision, development, or public health. Many international agencies perform
functions that host governments do not otherwise have the capacity to perform,
such as distributing vaccines or providing school supplies. In the case of
UNHCR, the Agency operates in many countries where domestic asylum
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regimes are weak or absent. When faced with mass influxes of displaced
foreigners, host countries rely on UNHCR for their expertise in managing
population flows, registering and processing refugees, and coordinating
humanitarian assistance by working with the international NGOs that partner
with the agency worldwide and training local organizations as well. When states
come to rely on these and other valuable services, this gives the agency leverage
over state behavior. If the agency were to threaten to stop providing some of its
services as a consequence of a state engaging in human rights violations, the
costs of losing those services could easily outweigh the costs of improving
human rights. When regulatory agencies provide a valuable service within
countries, the cost of kicking an agency out of a country is also much higher
than the cost of withdrawal from other human rights instruments, such as
multilateral human rights treaties. Thus, the presence of international agencies
makes it more likely that actual consequences will ensue for states that improve
their human rights practices, rather than the vague promise of reputational
benefits for treaty compliance.
International agencies may also have the advantage of being more inclusive
than treaty regimes. While states may be reluctant to sign international treaties,
they may be more likely to join international organizations and work with them,
particularly when those organizations provide valuable services. 1" As the
services of UNHCR and other international agencies develop, their potential to
protect human rights may increase.
International agencies can also provide an important function in aligning
the economic interests of states to promote human rights. Tying economic
benefits to human rights protections is not new. Linking rights protections with
economic agreements began at least as long ago as British attempts to abolish
the slave trade by conditioning trade on other states' agreement to do so.14
Economic sanctions have been used for years to attempt to force states to adopt
better human rights practices. However, as discussed above, providing economic
incentives may be more effective when done in conjunction with an
international administrative agency. International agencies derive considerable
authority and legitimacy from the international law that enables and underpins
their operations. An agency's authority to interpret law and promulgate
regulations applicable to a particular situation can enable its success in situations
involving political actors with competing interests. An international agency can
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provide valuable cover for states who do not wish to be seen dealing with each
other directly for other political reasons. During the Iraq war, for example, it
would have been impossible for the U.S. to provide direct humanitarian aid to
Syria when diplomatic relations with the country were strained. Providing aid
through UNHCR, contacting Syrian officials primarily under Agency auspices
such as at the Donor's Conference, and allowing UNHCR to coordinate aid to
Iraqi refugees enabled the U.S. to achieve its strategic goals of managing Iraqi
refugee flows while also credibly claiming to have suspended relations with the
Syrian government. In this way, the Agency provided valuable legal cover to
enable the coordination of state interests in a delicate political context.
B. How Other International Agencies Can Regulate
Human Rights
Other international agencies have begun to promote human rights by
coordinating state interests in a flexible legal context. The International Labour
Organization (ILO), with its multiple conventions and regulations relevant to
labor rights,146 presents the closest analog to the U.N. Refugee Agency in its
administrative and rulemaking authority, its monitoring capacity, and its
expansion of its mission. The ILO flexibly interprets the legal definitions in its
''core conventions," extending its mission to protect labor rights even in
member countries that have not signed those instruments.147 Like UNHCR, the
ILO operates through a network of field offices throughout the world, enabling
it to monitor activities in states. It uses supervisory mechanisms, technical
assistance, and sanctions as tools to get countries to improve their labor
standards.'4 8 Many of the ILO's programs are funded directly by donor states
through a supplemental budget, giving individual states significant control over
the agency's activities. Unlike UNHCR, however, most of the ILO's
supplemental budget comes from states other than the U.S., suggesting that
human rights protections can be achieved even without U.S. backing.
Besides UNHCR and the ILO, other international regulatory agencies also
have the potential to coordinate state incentives to promote human rights.
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Scholars have proposed the model of WTO dispute settlement to be expanded
to encompass human rights litigation that is linked to trade regulation. 149 ErnstUlrich Petersmann has argued that, in the context of international trade,
international organizations should serve as a "fourth branch of government"
that protects human rights across countries.' According to Petersmann, the
WTO already functions to protect human rights by promoting freedom and
non-discrimination."'5 Emilie Hafner-Burton has empirically shown that as the
inclusion of human rights provisions in preferential trade agreements has
increased over time, these provisions have influenced even bad actors to
improve their human rights practices." 2 The WTO's backing of these treaties has
supported their effectiveness.
Human rights are also becoming an increasing concern for other
international organizations. 5 3 The European Union conditions membership, in
part, on human rights practices, as discussed above. Organizations as diverse as
the World Bank and Interpol have added human rights as an area of
fundamental concern to their activities.11 4 Investment arbitration tribunals may
also have the potential to promote human rights."5 5 The incorporation of human
rights into the missions of these organizations suggests that these agencies are
beginning to see themselves as regulators of human rights. It remains to be seen
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what effect these organizations can have on improving the human rights
practices of bad actors.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS REGULATION BY INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
This study presents one example of how flexible interpretation of
international human rights law by a regulatory agency allowed the alignment of
the interests of bad actors and states interested in promoting human rights. I do
not suggest that regulatory regimes present a comprehensive solution to the bad
actor problem, nor that regulatory regimes will improve human rights in all
situations. The case of the post-2003 Iraqi refugees simply suggests that
regulatory agencies may have the potential to get bad actors to improve human
rights protections when they are able to align state interests under the cover of
law. More research is needed to determine how this model might apply in other
contexts involving problems of global governance. Developing international
agency programs to protect human rights, such as the ones discussed above, is a
ripe area for further research.
Critics may protest that international refugee law is too unique to provide
lessons for other areas of international human rights law. International refugee
law is unlike other instruments of international human rights law that commit
states not to harm their own citizens, because it commits states to provide rights
for citizens of other states. Moreover, while major international human rights
treaties have monitoring bodies and some procedure for individual complaints,
most do not have a large international organization that promulgates regulations
to implement the law, and that maintains field offices in most of the countries of
the world.
However, the other major instruments of international human rights law
implicitly commit states to protecting the rights of individuals beyond their
borders. The very act of commitment to multilateral treaties involving
international human rights law implies that states have an interest in the
wellbeing of citizens of other states. Otherwise, these states would not sign
multilateral treaties, but instead would create constitutional provisions or
domestic regulations to bind themselves to protecting human rights. Violation of
international refugee law, like violations of other human rights treaties, carries
with it the possibility of reciprocal or retaliatory behavior by other state
signatories against citizens of the violating state.1" 6 States and individuals
regularly protest human rights violations in other countries, signatories and nonsignatories alike. And citizens of liberal democracies have vigorously protested
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their countries' violations of foreigners, forcing their states to respond.'
Moreover, increasing numbers of international agreements, including trade
agreements, contain provisions that bind states to protect the human rights of
non-citizens resident in their countries in the context of labor migration.5 8 The
United Nations International Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers,
which entered into force in July 2003, has fifty-one signatories and represents a
major multilateral effort to address protections of non-citizens by the states that
host them." 9 As other international organizations are increasingly assuming the
role of protecting human rights, UNHCR's model may not be so unique.
Having international organizations regulate human rights may have some
drawbacks. International agencies are susceptible to many of the same
pathologies as domestic regulatory agencies. They may be prone to manipulation
by either host or donor governments seeking to advance their own foreign
policy agendas, or may be subject to capture by regulated entities. Accountability
and oversight may be difficult in a decentralized international system. A full
discussion of these pathologies and how to avoid them lies far beyond the scope
of this paper. However, careful institutional design can help mitigate many of
these problems.
More broadly, international agencies may potentially weaken the human
rights regime because of their function in coordinating the economic incentives
of states. Philip Alston, for example, has been critical of linkage between
economic incentives and human rights, particularly in the context of
international trade.16 Alston argues that linking trade and human rights would
cause human rights to "become detached from their foundations in human
dignity and would instead be viewed primarily as instrumental means for the
achievement of economic policy objectives."' 6 1 Alston's concerns are echoed by
others working in the human rights field, especially in the area of immigration
and refugee law. Applying a legal or economic framework to human rights
always risks dehumanizing the most tragic of circumstances.
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However, human rights have always been a part of state policy objectives,
economic or otherwise. Goldsmith and Posner argue that powerful states
intervene to protect human rights primarily when they have a corresponding
security interest.'62 The development of the modern human rights regime in the
wake of World War 1I was tied to broader foreign policy goals, namely, the idea
that human rights are fundamental to democracy, and that democracies are
unlikely to go to war with each other. During the Cold War, the U.S. wielded
human rights violations as a rhetorical tool to emphasize the divide between
democracy and communism. Countries give foreign aid to further their own
policy objectives while conditioning it on good human rights and development
practices. If human dignity has not already been compromised by these
practices, additional, more formalized links between economic incentives and
human rights are unlikely to do so.
Other authors have expressed a concern with the fragmentation of
international human rights law.'63 Those who fear fragmentation argue that
having multiple international human rights regimes creates a risk that the
meanings of particular norms will conflict.'64 This may decrease the unity of
international human rights law and prevent an individual from fully asserting all
of the human rights and dignities to which she is entitled. 6 However, I argue
that this concern is overstated. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
together with the ICCPR and the ICESCR, already provide a comprehensive set
of aspirational human rights norms that have been recognized by most of the
countries of the world.'6 6 The ultimate goal of universal achievement of these
rights will not be undermined if international agencies provide incentives for bad
actors to improve their human rights practices. Human rights are public goods;
the enjoyment of human rights by some individuals in specific situations does
not preclude other people from enjoying their human rights in other times and
places. Similarly, a state's allowing an individual to assert her rights in one
instance does not preclude it from allowing others to assert the same or different
rights at another time.
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Moreover, flexible interpretation of human rights treaties can be viewed
not as fragmenting rights, but as part of a process of unifying human rights
norms. Attempts by multiple actors to improve human rights practices may be
steps along the way to a unified human rights regime. In line with other theories
of human rights that suggest that states will adopt practices over time through
processes leading to persuasion or acculturation, a state's guarantee of rights in a
situation-specific context may open it to the idea of providing rights in a broader
way in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
Rigid systems for implementation of law have benefits and drawbacks.
Sentencing guidelines in criminal law, or administrative regulations that are
consistent and uniformly applicable, with minimal room for agency or judicial
discretion, promote predictability, consistency, and equal application of the law.
Rigid systems, however, cannot adapt to changing contexts and individual
circumstances. Regulatory enforcement addresses these concerns by granting
regulators discretion to apply law more flexibly, taking into consideration
specific facts on the ground and the context of individual needs. Regulatory
regimes also allow the regulated entity to express its particular, circumstantial
needs.
As the case of the post-2003 Iraqi refugee crisis shows, an international
regulatory agency may achieve improvements in human rights practices of
known bad actors by interpreting international law flexibly. Here, an
international regulator relaxed the definition of "refugee" to allow its services to
a broader group of people. This flexible interpretation of international refugee
law, plus the Agency's successful efforts to align donor and host country
incentives through economic transfers, led to a change in state behavior and the
improvement of the human rights of refugees. Without the flexible regulatory
approach adopted by UNHCR, donor countries would not have had the cover
to provide the economic incentives to host states that changed their human
rights practices. The Agency's actions may have been contrary to the intentions
of the framers of international refugee law, who desired to provide specific legal
protections to persecuted individuals. However, this flexible approach likely
improved the human rights of Iraqis as a group more than otherwise would have
been possible. While some refugees certainly remained in difficult circumstances,
the baseline treatment of needy Iraqi refugees, as a group, in Jordan and Syria
certainly improved after UNHCR's legal and regulatory efforts.
This example suggests that regulation of human rights by international
organizations can help induce bad actors to change their behavior. International
organizations promulgate rules that allow for flexibility in implementing human
rights protections given the constraints of particular country contexts. Through
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monitoring and enforcement functions, international agencies also provide boots
on the ground to ensure that compliance with their rules actually occurs.
International organizations may provide a valuable intermediary between states
who wish to improve human rights outcomes and known bad actors, with
whom they may not want to politically engage. International organizations can
align state interests, through financial incentives or otherwise, in a way that can
change the cost-benefit analyses of states to get them to improve their human
rights practices. International organizations also can enhance the credibility of a
multilateral commitment to improve the behavior of bad actors. By providing
valuable services to host countries, international agencies may be well positioned
to negotiate for human rights protections over time. Thus, by using international
organizations to promote human rights, we may get more than what we pay for.
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